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Liveness detection in biometrics: face, fingerprint, iris and voice

The Face Benchmark editorsPublishedFigures checked

Liveness detection in biometrics is tested one modality at a time, with shared ISO/IEC 30107 vocabulary and separate datasets. The clearest long record is fingerprint: across the LivDet competitions of 2009 to 2021, the mean BPCER of the three best algorithms fell from 22.03 percent to 1.1 percent, but their mean APCER rose to 27.02 percent in 2021 after a new spoof method appeared (arXiv 2202.07259, read 10 November 2026).

This page belongs to the deepfake detection hub and widens the face-only view of liveness and injection attacks to the other biometrics. Face has its own data page, four face anti-spoofing datasets compared, and voice has its own, so this one concentrates on fingerprint and iris.

01What does liveness detection mean across biometrics?

ISO/IEC 30107-1:2023 defines presentation attack detection as "automated discrimination between bona-fide presentations and biometric presentation attacks". The definitions speak of a "biometric characteristic" and name no modality, and the list of attack instruments includes "lifeless biometric characteristics" and "altered biometric characteristics". Liveness detection is one family of methods inside that frame.

The companion part, ISO/IEC 30107-3:2023, "establishes principles and methods for performance assessment of PAD mechanisms" and covers the reporting of test results. The page on ISO/IEC 30107-3 explained walks through its terms.

02Which error rates carry across modalities?

Two do. APCER is the share of attack presentations wrongly accepted as genuine, and BPCER is the share of genuine presentations wrongly rejected. The LivDet review maps its older fingerprint terms onto them: "FerrFake" is APCER and "FerrLive" is BPCER. The same pair is used in face papers, and the LivDet-Iris organisers use them for iris. The APCER and BPCER page defines both with the attack-type condition the standard attaches.

Speech is the exception. The ASVspoof challenges report the tandem detection cost function and the equal error rate, because a speaker verification system sits in the loop, as the voice liveness detection page explains.

03How has fingerprint liveness improved?

The LivDet fingerprint competition has run every two years since 2009. The 2009 to 2021 review counts 4 participants and 4 algorithms in 2009 and 13 participants and 23 algorithms in 2021. Each edition uses a different set of scanners, materials and challenges, so the review warns that comparing editions is "non-trivial".

Averaged over the three best algorithms of each edition, BPCER fell from 22.03 percent in 2009 to 1.1 percent in 2021, and APCER fell from 26.97 percent in 2011 to 4.75 in 2019. Then 2021 broke the trend: mean APCER was 27.02 percent. The review explains the jump partly by a new fabrication method, ScreenSpoof, and hypothesises that the 2021 training set holding no glue-like material left glue spoofs in the test set new to every system. Its conclusion is that "the representativeness of the training set has a serious influence on their accuracy".

The review also reports that on the integrated competitions of 2019 and 2021, where liveness runs inside a matching system, algorithms reached an average accuracy of around 90 percent, meaning a typical system "would miss 10% of both presentation attacks and legitimate presentations".

04How hard is iris liveness?

Iris results show the same sensitivity to what the test set contains. The LivDet-Iris series began in 2013, and its 2020 paper tabulates the best performance of each edition.

Edition Attack types in the test data Competitors Best APCER Best BPCER
2013 Printed irises, patterned contact lenses 3 5.7 percent 28.6 percent
2015 Printed irises, patterned contact lenses 4 5.48 percent 1.68 percent
2017 Printed irises, patterned contact lenses 3 14.71 percent 3.36 percent
2020 Adds eyes shown on a screen, prosthetic eyes with add-ons, cadaver irises 3 59.10 percent 0.46 percent

In 2020 the best performing entry reported a weighted average APCER of 59.10 percent over all five attack types, and the organisers say the paper "serves as the latest evaluation of iris PAD on a large spectrum of presentation attack instruments" (arXiv 2009.00749). The 2023 edition added GAN-generated iris images and compared algorithms with human accuracy. Its best weighted result was an average classification error rate of 37.31 percent, and the paper concludes that "iris PAD is still a challenging problem" (arXiv 2310.04541).

Notice the pattern from 2015 on: BPCER stays low while APCER rises as the attack list grows. A system tuned to reject little that is genuine can still accept many attacks it has not seen.

Fingerprint liveness error rates by LivDet edition, in percentGrouped bars, mean of the three best algorithms per edition, in percent. BPCER and APCER: 2009 22.03 and 12.47; 2011 23.52 and 26.97; 2013 6.26 and 21.55; 2015 5.94 and 6.89; 2017 4.99 and 4.97; 2019 4.15 and 4.75; 2021 1.10 and 27.02. Source: Review of the LivDet competition series 2009 to 2021, arXiv 2202.07259, Table 4, read 10 Nov 2026.0.007.5015.0022.5030.00BPCER (live rejected)APCER (fake accepted)LivDet 200922.0312.47LivDet 201123.5226.97LivDet 20136.2621.55LivDet 20155.946.89LivDet 20174.994.97LivDet 20194.154.75LivDet 20211.1027.02
Figure 1Mean BPCER and APCER of the three best fingerprint algorithms in each LivDet edition. BPCER fell almost every edition; APCER jumped in 2021 when a new spoof fabrication method and unseen materials entered the test set. Source: arXiv 2202.07259, Table 4, read 10 Nov 2026.

05Why can scores not be compared across modalities?

Each modality has its own attack species, capture devices and test data. A face system is attacked with prints and replays; a fingerprint system with moulded materials and, since 2021, screen-based spoofs; an iris system with printed eyes, lenses and cadaver eyes. An APCER of 5 percent on one tells you nothing about another.

The LivDet-Iris 2020 paper also notes that its summary rate, ACER, "has been deprecated in ISO/IEC 30107-3:2017" for industry-related evaluations, so the two component rates are the figures to read. Fingerprint and iris results are measured at the sensor, and the full-system tests of NIST FRTE and the face verification metrics measure a different layer: whether the right person is matched, not whether a person is present.

SRCSources

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    Review of the Fingerprint Liveness Detection (LivDet) competition series: from 2009 to 2021(external)Micheletto, Orrù, Casula, Yambay, Marcialis, Schuckers. 2022
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FAQQuestions

What is liveness detection in biometrics?

Software or hardware that decides whether a biometric sample comes from a live person or an artefact such as a print, a mould or a replay. ISO/IEC 30107-1:2023 frames it as presentation attack detection, "automated discrimination between bona-fide presentations and biometric presentation attacks".

How accurate is fingerprint liveness detection?

In the LivDet 2021 competition the three best algorithms averaged a BPCER of 1.1 percent and an APCER of 27.02 percent. The APCER was far higher than the 4.75 percent of 2019 because 2021 added a new spoof fabrication method and unseen materials.

How accurate is iris liveness detection?

In LivDet-Iris 2020 the best entry reported a weighted average APCER of 59.10 percent and a BPCER of 0.46 percent over five attack types. In 2023 the best weighted classification error rate was 37.31 percent, so iris liveness remains an open problem.

Do all biometrics use the same standard for liveness testing?

The ISO/IEC 30107 series speaks of any biometric characteristic, and face, fingerprint and iris papers report APCER and BPCER. Speech challenges such as ASVspoof use the tandem detection cost function and the equal error rate instead.

Does liveness detection stop deepfakes?

Only deepfakes presented to a sensor. These tests assume the attack takes place at the capture device, so video injected past the camera is a separate threat covered on the injection attacks page.