Deepfake detection algorithms: 20 named methods, their cues, backbones and benchmark scores
The Face Benchmark editorsPublishedFigures checked
A deepfake detection algorithm is a trained model that reads a face image or clip and outputs a real or fake score. The table below names twenty of them with the cue each one reads, its backbone and its venue. Fifteen carry a DeepfakeBench cross-dataset average, from 0.6551 for Meso4 to 0.7875 for SPSL (NeurIPS 2023, Table 3).
This glossary is part of the deepfake detection hub. It gives each method one line; the plain definition of deepfake detection explains what the score means, and the DeepfakeBench codebase is where fifteen of the twenty were run under one protocol.
01What counts as a deepfake detection algorithm?
In the papers, a detection algorithm has three parts: a cue, a backbone and a training recipe. The cue is what the model is pushed to look at, such as a blending boundary, a phase spectrum or a temporal break. The backbone is the network that turns pixels into features, and in this field it is very often Xception, the depthwise separable convolution network Chollet published in 2016 (arXiv 1610.02357). The recipe is the data, the augmentation and the loss.
The DeepfakeBench paper (Yan et al., NeurIPS 2023) is the only source that ran a large set of these algorithms under one preprocessing, one training set and one metric, so it supplies the backbone and venue columns for its fifteen detectors and the only comparable score (arXiv 2307.01426). The five further methods come from the benchmark's version 2 README, which lists 36 detectors in all but has not yet published their table.
02Twenty methods in one table
Every row names the paper's method, the family DeepfakeBench assigns it, the backbone from Table 1 of that paper or from the method's own abstract, the venue, and the cross-dataset average frame-level AUC from Table 3, where all detectors were trained on FaceForensics++ c23 and tested on eight other sets. Rows without a Table 3 figure were added to the benchmark after the paper.
| Method | Cue family | What it reads | Backbone | Venue | Cross-dataset AUC |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| MesoNet (Meso4) | Naive | Mesoscopic image properties with a shallow CNN | Designed CNN | WIFS 2018 | 0.6551 |
| MesoInception | Naive | Same cue with Inception modules | Designed CNN | WIFS 2018 | 0.7364 |
| CNN-Aug | Naive | Whole-image classifier trained on ProGAN with heavy augmentation | ResNet | CVPR 2020 | 0.7020 |
| EfficientNet-B4 | Naive | Compound-scaled CNN used as a binary classifier | EfficientNet | ICML 2019 | 0.7718 |
| Xception | Naive | Per-frame binary classifier, the FaceForensics++ baseline | Xception | ICCV 2019 | 0.7718 |
| Capsule | Spatial | Capsule network over several spoof kinds | Designed capsule | ICASSP 2019 | 0.7488 |
| DSP-FWA | Spatial | Affine warping artefacts from low-resolution swaps | Xception | CVPRW 2019 | 0.7239 |
| Face X-ray | Spatial | A greyscale map of the blending boundary | HRNet | CVPR 2020 | 0.6985 |
| FFD | Spatial | Attention maps over manipulated regions | Xception | CVPR 2020 | 0.7733 |
| CORE | Spatial | Consistent features across augmentations | Xception | CVPRW 2022 | 0.7694 |
| RECCE | Spatial | Reconstruction of real faces plus classification | Designed networks | CVPR 2022 | 0.7649 |
| UCF | Spatial | Common forgery features after disentanglement | Xception | ICCV 2023 | 0.7801 |
| F3Net | Frequency | DCT components and local frequency statistics | Xception | ECCV 2020 | 0.7645 |
| SPSL | Frequency | Phase spectrum of up-sampling artefacts | Xception | CVPR 2021 | 0.7875 |
| SRM | Frequency | High-frequency noise residuals | Xception | CVPR 2021 | 0.7760 |
| SBI | Spatial | Self-blended training fakes from one real image | Not in Table 1 | CVPR 2022 | Not in the paper's table |
| SLADD | Spatial | Adversarially synthesised forgeries | Not in Table 1 | CVPR 2022 | Not in the paper's table |
| LSDA | Spatial | Latent-space augmentation across forgery types | Not in Table 1 | CVPR 2024 | Not in the paper's table |
| Effort | Spatial | Orthogonal subspaces of a foundation model's features | Vision foundation model | ICML 2025 | Not in the paper's table |
| FTCN | Video | Temporal convolution with spatial kernels of size 1 | Designed 3D CNN plus transformer | ICCV 2021 | Not in the paper's table |
The per-dataset numbers behind the last column, including the FaceForensics++ in-dataset scores, are on the results table by test set, and the cross-dataset ordering of the fifteen is the subject of the ranked detectors page.
03How are the methods grouped by cue family?
DeepfakeBench divides detection into three categories. A naive detector "employs CNNs to directly distinguish deepfake content from authentic data"; MesoNet and Xception are its examples. A spatial detector looks for a specific representation such as forgery region location, a capsule network, disentanglement learning or image reconstruction. A frequency detector works in the frequency domain, and the paper names SPSL and SRM as examples that use "phase spectrum analysis and high-frequency noises, respectively".
The version 2 README keeps those labels and adds a video group. It files SBI, SLADD, LSDA and Effort among its 20 spatial detectors and FTCN among its 8 video detectors, which is why the figure on this page shows 5 naive, 11 spatial, 3 frequency and 1 video method. The labels describe the training signal, not the architecture: SBI and Face X-ray both target blending, but one learns from self-made fakes and the other from a boundary map.
05Which methods have no DeepfakeBench score, and why?
Five rows carry no cross-dataset figure. SBI, SLADD, LSDA, Effort and FTCN were added in DeepfakeBench version 2, and the README states that the results table "will update the below table soon" while still showing the paper's fifteen rows. Until that table appears, the only comparable numbers for those five are the ones in their own papers, which were produced under their own preprocessing and frame counts and are not placed next to the Table 3 column here.
Those papers do state what they changed. SBI reports that its self-blended training data "outperforms the baseline by 4.90% and 11.78% points in the cross-dataset evaluation" on DFDC and DFDCP (arXiv 2204.08376). FTCN reduces "the spatial convolution kernel size to 1, while maintaining the temporal convolution kernel size unchanged" (arXiv 2108.06693). Effort uses singular value decomposition "to decompose the original feature space into two orthogonal subspaces" of a pre-trained vision model (arXiv 2411.15633). Each is a claim from the authors, measured on their own terms.
06How should the cross-dataset column be read?
The column is one number per detector: the mean of eight frame-level AUCs on Celeb-DF v1 and v2, DeeperForensics-1.0, DFD, DFDC, DFDC Preview, FaceShifter and UADFV, after training on FaceForensics++ c23 only. The spread is narrow. Thirteen of the fifteen sit between 0.70 and 0.79, and the paper itself notes that naive detectors "register high AUC values that are comparable to more sophisticated algorithms". A gap of 0.01 in this column is smaller than the roughly 2 percent change the paper reports from removing all augmentations in its ablations.
No single benchmark average predicts how a detector performs on a manipulation it has not seen. Xception, re-run by the DF40 authors on nine unknown-domain sets built with newer generators, averaged 0.546 AUC in 2024, which the catalogue of generation methods covers. Read the column as a ranking under one protocol in 2023, not as a property of the algorithm.
SRCSources
- S1DeepfakeBench: A Comprehensive Benchmark of Deepfake Detection(external)Yan, Zhang, Yuan, Lyu, Wu. NeurIPS 2023 Datasets and BenchmarksChecked
- S2DeepfakeBench repository README, version 2 detector list(external)SCLBD. 2025Checked
- S3FaceForensics++: Learning to Detect Manipulated Facial Images(external)Rössler, Cozzolino, Verdoliva, Riess, Thies, Nießner. ICCV 2019Checked
- S4Detecting Deepfakes with Self-Blended Images(external)Shiohara, Yamasaki. CVPR 2022Checked
- S5Exploring Temporal Coherence for More General Video Face Forgery Detection(external)Zheng, Bao, Chen, Zeng, Wen. ICCV 2021Checked
FAQQuestions
Which deepfake detection algorithm scores highest across datasets?
SPSL, at a cross-dataset average AUC of 0.7875 in DeepfakeBench Table 3, followed by UCF at 0.7801 and SRM at 0.7760. All three were trained on FaceForensics++ c23 and tested on eight other sets under the benchmark's protocol in 2023.
How many deepfake detection algorithms exist?
DeepfakeBench version 2 supports 36 detection methods, 28 image and 8 video, and its 2023 paper benchmarked 15. This page lists 20 of them; many more appear in papers without a shared benchmark run, so no complete count exists.
What is the difference between a naive, spatial and frequency detector?
A naive detector is a CNN classifier trained directly on real and fake faces, such as Xception. A spatial detector is pushed toward a specific image cue, such as a blending boundary or a reconstruction error. A frequency detector reads the spectrum or noise residual instead of the pixels. The labels come from the DeepfakeBench paper.
Why do so many detectors use Xception?
Because FaceForensics++ found in 2019 that XceptionNet beat every other classifier it tried on per-frame detection, and DeepfakeBench later found that Xception and EfficientNet-B4 outperform ResNet34 at a similar parameter count. Eight of the fifteen detectors in DeepfakeBench Table 1 use it.
Do newer algorithms such as SBI or Effort beat the 2023 table?
Their own papers report gains, for example SBI's 4.90 and 11.78 point improvements on DFDC and DFDCP over its baseline, but DeepfakeBench has not yet published a version 2 table that places them beside the fifteen under one protocol, so no comparable figure appears here.